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Exactly one week before Chief Justice Warren E. Burger's retire-
ment was publicly announced (the White House knew in advance of
his plan), the Supreme Court gave President Reagan and his aides a
reminder of what could be at stake in the selection of his successor.
More than anything else in its domestic aspirations, the Reagan Ad-
ministration wanted a more conservative Court, especially to raise the
chances for overruling Roe v. Wade'-that despised legacy of the Bur-
ger Court. On June 11, 1986, the Court reaffirmed the right to seek
an abortion, but this time it was only by the narrowest of margins-5
to 4 . That had never happened before. As important as the vote it-
self was the fact that four Justices, the dissenters, made it clear they
were ready to reconsider Roe; thus, a single vote seemed to hold Roe in
place.
The Reagan Administration, of course, had other ambitions for a
more conservative Court. It was eager for a revival of the prerogatives
of the states-its "New Federalism" campaign. It wanted to close the
widening separatism on church-state matters. It was troubled by the
Burger Court's failure to do much in rolling back the "arren Court's
constitutional protections for criminal suspects.
In the mind of President Reagan's advisers, Associate Justice Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist was just the nominee who would advance the Ad-
ministration's agenda on abortion, federalism, religion, and crime.
Indeed, Rehnquist had been a dissenter in Roe v. Wade, and in
1986, he remained a staunch opponent. He was one of the dissenters
in the Thornburgh case that year. Another was Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. But, as matters turned out, it was Rehnquist, not
O'Connor, who emerged from White House scrutiny in the selection
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of a new Chief Justice. In fact, word leaked out of the White House,
after the June 18 announcement of Rehnquist's appointment, that
O'Connor had been passed over. One news account based on those
leaks said:
The apparent reason for [O'Connor's] failure... is a strong indication
of the aides' determination to get someone to head the Supreme Court
who could be depended upon to stay loyal to the President's notion of
judicial conservatism. Justice O'Connor, sources here said, was dropped
because she could not compete with Justice Rehnquist on the depend-
ability index that those weighing the choice used .... Her recent voting
patterns seem to have suggested to some key officials that she may not
turn out to be as conservative in her views, or at least not as predictably
conservative, as he is. 
3
And, of course, those White House lieutenants turned out to be
quite right.
Because of O'Connor, in significant j)art, the campaign to cast Roe
aside had not succeeded, despite repeated tries by Reagan Administra-
tion lawyers appearing in the Supreme Court.4 And it was anything
but clear that there actually had been a "Reagan Revolution" on the
Court, at least not one genuinely deserving of the word "revolution"-
again, mostly because the moderate centrism of O'Connor remained
a constraint. That goal remained as elusive-and yet as eagerly de-
sired-when Rehnquist died in office on September 3, 2005, as on the
day he was elevated to the ChiefJusticeship.
True, Rehnquist had succeeded-with significant aid from
O'Connor-in the restoration of the concept of "state sovereignty"
and a revival of federalism jurisprudence. That, indeed, was
Rehnquist's most significant personal contribution to American juris-
prudence. 5 But Rehnquist was not able to mass a Court for anything
more than an incremental advance of conservative church-state deci-
sions, and it was he who wrote the decision in Dickerson v. U.S.,6 put-
ting the Miranda v. Arizona' decision on a firm constitutional founda-
tion for the first time, and for no less than a 7-2 majority-exactly the
3 Lyle Denniston & Robert Timberg, Reliability as Consnvalive Won Post Jir
Rehvquist, BALT. SUN, June 19, 1986.
4 See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUlION-A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991). The core holding of Roe v. Wade was salvaged in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
, He began this project in earnest in his third year on the Coutt, in a dissenting
opinion in the otherwise rather obscure case ofF0 , v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
7 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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result against which Reagan's Attorney General, Edwin Meese, had so
passionately warred.
Rehnquist was also unable to stop the opening and expansion of a
new gay rights jurisprudence, a development that the nation's Chris-
tian conservatives (and many Republican officeholders) saw as tearing
at the very social fabric of the nation. And he had cast his vote to
support the Court's ruling, perhaps the most important in history on
women's equality, in the Virginia Military Institute case.
s
If the Chief Justice had been stymied in a bid to revolutionize the
Court, so had Justice Antonin Scalia-named by President Reagan to
take Rehnquist's seat. Widely regarded as brilliant and ambitious,
Scalia was expected, alongside Rehnquist, to lead the Court inexora-
bly to the right; he would be its Jphilosopher king. But that "conserva-
tive moment" came and went. 9
But then there came Justice O'Connor's retirement on July 1,
2005, and a sea change in the Court's modern history seemed ready to
begin, especially with President George W. Bush, a deep-dyed conser-
vative, in the W hite House. A much more politically confident Chris-
tian Right was now determined to make over the Supreme Court in its
own image.
The "sons of the Reagan Revolution," a cadre of smart, young le-
gal professionals, who had populated the Justice Department under
Edwin Meese in the Reagan years (providing it with some of the
brashest ideas for changing the law), were now grown-up, accom-
plished lawyers and judges who-by all appearances-were still true
believers in the cause. Their names showed up on every short list for
Supreme Court nominations in the Bush II Administration. It was
from that list that the President, first and last, was determined to
pluckJohn Glover Roberts, Jr., a freshman federal Circuit Courtjudge
who had been one of the most seasoned and respected advocates at
the Supreme Court Bar after his stint lawyering in the Reagan Ad-
ministration. There was no hesitancy in the White House in putting
him forth for O'Connor's seat, because that was the one that was defi-
nitely available, and it was seen by insiders as merely a way station en
route to his becoming ChiefJustice. With Rehnquist's death, Roberts
was Jpromptly moved up in an overnight switch.
A United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). Rehnquist supported the judg-
ment that VMI had violated women's rights, but he suggested a narrow remedy that
compelled admission of women to the Institute.
9 See geneally CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME
COURT'S CONSERVATIVE MOMENT 1-24 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court's conser-
vatism, which was partly achieved through the change in the Court's composition).
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After the President was rudely reminded of what was demanded of
him by his conservative political base in the fiasco over the nomina-
tion of White House Counsel Harriet E. Miers to succeed O'Connor,
the President reached quite purposefully to the far right of the lower
federal bench, and nominated Samuel A. Alito, Jr.-so conservative
that the media loved reminding everyone that lie had sometimes been
called "Scalito," an ideological clone of Justice Antonin Scalia. Alito
had been another star in the ReaganJustice Department.
So, there it was: the "Roberts Court," the best and brightest hope
of the committed and long-disappointed Reaganites. How soon would
great civil rights precedents begin falling? Liberal activist groups like
People for the American Way and the Alliance for Justice were per-
suaded that doomsday was at hand. How long would it be before even
Roe was overruled? And, if not Roe right away, how about Planned Par-
enthood v. Casey, the decision partially reaffirming Roe's core holding?
That was one of the most important decisions O'Connor had helped
fashion, so its fate could be a bellwether of a changed judicial climate.
And what about the Supreme Court's attitude toward the war on
terrorism, and its reaction to the breathtaking claims of presidential
war powers asserted by President Bush and Vice President Cheney?
There was speculation, not easily dismissed, that a "Roberts Court"
would fall meekly in line behind the White House, just as Congress
had done since 9/11, even though the Rehnquist Court had refused
to do so in 2004 in the first test case.) Judge Roberts, on the D.C. Cir-
cuit, had been part of a majority on that court to uphold the Presi-
dent's power to create "war crimes" tribunals to try war-on-terrorism
suspects held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. " And Alito, as a young law-
yer in the Justice Department, had been a hearty supporter of the
Edwin Meese project of expanding presidential power-a project that
would pale, in its dimensions, to the Executive ambitions of the
George W. Bush presidency.'-
2
The addition of Roberts and Alito to the Court, to be sure, did not
make a new conservative majority a certainty. Reaganites and the
Bush political base had long since lost all hope for Justice David H.
Ii Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
Rumsfeld v. Hamdan, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
12 Alito's most significant contribution, so far as is publicly known, involved cham-
pioning the expanded use of presidential signing statements (public declarations when
a president signs a bill into law) to advance Executive authority to say what a law
meant, even if contrary to what Congress had legislated. This would become a central
tenet of the Bush Administration strategy for enhancing presidential war powers.
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Souter, put on the Court by George H. W. Bush, and had grown al-
most equally exasperated with Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a Reagan
aJ)pointee. And those two could be found, regularly for Souter, often
for Kennedy, making common cause with the liberal bloc: Justices
John Paul Stevens (a Gerald Ford nomninee), Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
and Stephen G. Breyer (both Bill Clinton nominees). If Roberts and
Alito were, in fact, as conservative as President Bush yearned for them
to be, they could ally with Justice Scalia (a Reagan appointee) and Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas (named by Bush I). But that would still only
make four.
The most likely prospect, at least in the short term, then, ap-
peared not to be a Reagan revolutionary Court, but more likely a
Court that would imitate the latter years of the Rehnquist Court-a
"splitthe-difference" Court.
Chief Justice Roberts, as a nominee before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, had talked of the virtues of judicial modesty. He gave no
indication that he would be prepared to lead a wholesale assault on
precedent, and only the deepest cynic could suggest that he was dis-
seni)ling on the point. Those who knew him were certain that he
would want to lead the Court more than he would want to fade into
irrelevance as a frustrated, yet ideologically pure, dissenter. After all,
at age fifty as he began his service, he had time to wait for the Court of
the fitture to unfold, and ample opportunity to shape it. He would be
a conservative, no doubt, and the Court he would lead would be more
conservative than Rehnquist's had been; O'Connor's departure made
sure of that. But would he, and the Court, be what President Bush
and his followers had imagined? Would this be the true "Rehnquist
Court" (albeit led by a former Rehnquist clerk) that had never quite
come into being?
There is the beginning of a record now-more so for ChiefJustice
Roberts than for Justice Alito, who, although arriving in time to take
part in some of its most important decisions, served just a little more
than half of the Court's 2005 term.
3 J. Hacvie Wilkinson III, The Re/inquist Coast al Twilightl: The Lures and Peils o/?
Split-the-ki//erenceJuriisudeice, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1969 (2006) (conceptualizing the juris-
prudence of the late Rehnquist Court). Judge Wilkinson applies his label only to the
work of the Rehnquist Court in its final five years, and treats this time as a marked shift
in itsjurisprudence as the Court began to "tackle the most controversial issues before it
by splitting the difference" and to "drift into fine-shaven outcomes." Id. at 1971. It is
at least arguable that the phenomenon he describes could be applied throughout the
Rehnquist years, primarily because of Justice O'Connor's abiding devotion to that style
ofj urisprudence.
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Figures 14 compiled by the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Haner
& Feld LLP15 show that Roberts and Alito "agreed in full in 89% of the
cases they both heard." Roberts agreed with Scalia 85% of the time
and with Thomas 83%. But lie also agreed 81% of the time with Ken-
nedy. Alito, according to the data, agreed in lill with Thomas and
Kennedy 76% of the time and with Scalia 74%.'(
In the term's twelve 5-4 splits, Akin Gump's report says that Ken-
nedy was in the majority nine times, Roberts and Scalia eight each,
and Thomas seven. Alito voted on nine 5-4 splits, and was in the ma-
jority six times. None of the Court's more liberal members exceeded
six times in a 5-4 majority (Ginsburg was in such a majority six times,
Stevens and Souter five, and Breyer four) .
That is a statistical portrait of a conservative-leaning Court.
Somewhat more revealing are some of the details in particular cases.
In them, "fine-shaven outcomes," in Judge Wilkinson's phrase, are
more evident.
It is possible to argue that this was the pattern in most of the truly
major outcomes of the term, including the war on terrorism cases,18
the Texas redistricting case, the knock-and-announce criminal20 929
case, the Clean Water Act cases, and the campaign finance cases.
1 Memorandum fiom Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, End of Term Statistics
and Analysis-October Term 2005 (June 29, 2006), available at http://
wNw.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/EndofTeimAnalysis.pdf (providing a
breakdown of 2005 term cases by "split and unanimous decisions," "agreement be-
tween pairs of Justices," and the frequency with which each Justice dissented).
1) In the interest of fuill disclosure, note that this is the law firm that sponsors
www.scotusblog.com, for which the author is a Supreme Court correspondent. The
author operates independently of the firm's law practice.
1 Memorandum f-iom Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, supra note 14, at 3.
17 ld. at 2.
is See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (providing a majority opinion
as to most sections of the holding and a plurality opinion as to one section of the
judgment, with two concurrences and three dissents also filed); se also Padilla v. Hanft,
126 S. Ct. 1649, 1650 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (denying certiorari because of
"strong prudential considerations" where the legality of Padilla's current custodial
status was uncontested).
1 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (illustrat-
ing the Court's careful carving of issues, with Justices joining, concurring in part, and
dissenting in part for each section of the opinion).
20 See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006) (achieving a majority for only
three of four sections of the opinion, with four Justices dissenting).
21 See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (reflecting a plurality opin-
ion of four Justicesjoining with one concurrence, and fourJustices dissenting).
22 See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (providing the Court's resultant
opinion as a compilation of sections in which variousJustices joined or concurred, with
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But, this more revealing, close-tip portrait is exceptionally vivid in
one field of law that is sure to continue to provide a measure of the
Roberts Court's conservative tendencies-that is, of course, the issue
of abortion, the prime target of the would-have-been "Reagan Revolu-
tion."
It is thus worth examining-early though it may be-the new
Court's initial responses in that field to test the proposition. There
were a few developments, none of which by itself would qualify among
the most significant actions of the term, but each telling in its own
right. Two were rulings, and one was an order managing the scope of
review in a forthcoming case.
The first was the unaninous ruling in Ayotte v. Planned Parent-
hood,2' decided on January 18, 2006 (before Justice Alito joined the
Court). This holding was one of te early indications of the new
Chief Justice's stated desire to encourage more unanimity on the
Court, even in controversial areas of its work. He assigned the opin-
ion to Justice O'Connor, one of the architects of Casey, who was then
about to conclude her service. Probably with some urging from Rob-
erts, the Court's two implacable foes of abortion rights-Justices Scalia
and Thomas-were persuaded not only to remain silent, but to join
the opinion. That was somewhat remarkable, especially since the
Court declared that it was "established" by precedent that "a State may
not restrict access to abortions that are 'necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for preservation of the life or health of the
mother.'""
It is true that the opinion, at the outset, declared that "[w]e do
not revisit our abortion precedents today, but rather address a ques-
tion of remedy. 2 5 That perhaps was a way to ward off dissents, but it
ordinarily would not appear to have I)een strong enough to do so in
this area of law that so bitterly divides the Court.
Perhaps it helped that the decision was confined to the narrowest
possible ground, as an exercise in judicial modesty. The Court or-
dered a new review of the scope of an injunction against enforcement
of the state law at issue. But the Court had been asked, by the state of
threeJustices dissenting).
2, No. 04-1144, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://
www.supiemecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/04-1144.pdf (vacating and remanding a
First Circuit decision upholding a permanent injunction against enforcement of a New
Hampshire law requiring parental notice before a teenager may have an abortion).
24 Id. at 6 (citing, inter alia, the Casty decision).
2, Id. at 1.
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New Hampshire, to decide a question the Court has never quite set-
tled: the constitutional standard for judging facial challenges to abor-
tion restrictions. 7 The Court has seemed to assume that it would not
insist upon the most rigorous standard, but the issue remains open.
Several of the amici in the Ayotte case had also sought to test that as-
sumption by raising the Salerno issue."s
A pair of amici, two "individual activists seeking an end to abor-
tion ,,2 t) boldly asked the Court to address "whether Roe v. Wade and its
progeny are in fact viable in the face of a growing body of literature
that suggests that the court erred."" The nation's Catholic bishops
also argued in an amicus filing that "we believe Casey was wrongly de-
cided."31
This is not to suggest that the Court was in any way obliged to ad-
dress such fundamental issues, but the resistance to temptation, if
temptation did exist, may well have been the kind of 'judicial mod-
esty" that the new Chief Justice has advocated. W"hatever the reason
for resisting, the end result was that Ayotte, a closely watched new test
on abortion rights, created little if any new law.
In a second decision (in which Alito did not participate), the
Court swiftly and unanimously put an end to a case that had been the
hardest-fought courthouse battle over blockades of abortion clinics-a
case lingering in the courts for two decades and twice before decided
by the Court. 32 The Court avoided deciding one of the broader is-
sues-whether a private party could sue under the anti-racketeering
RICO law for an injunction-and instead resolved narrowly the ques-
tion of the coverage of violent conduct under the Hobbs Act. Crafted
26 See Questions Presented for Review, available at http://www.supiemecouirtus.gov
/qp/04-01144qp.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
27 The issue is whether such facial challenges must be judged only by the so-called
"Salerno standard." See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (holding that
a facial challenge may not succeed unless "no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid.").
28 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Liberty Counsel for Petitioner at 4, Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood, No. 04-1144, 2005 MIL 1902108 at *10-27 (U.S. 2005) (arguing
the Salerno standard preserves the balance of rights between courts and legislatures).
29 Amicus Curiae Brief of Margie Riley and Laurette Elsbeiiy for Petitioner at 1,
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, No. 04-1144, 2005 WL 1912325, at *2 (U.S. 2005).
ld. at 4, WL 1912325 at *5 (citations omitted).
Amicus Curiae Brief of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and Ro-
man Catholic Bishops of Manchester for Petitioner at 23, Ayotte v. Planned Parent-
hood, No. 04-1144, 2005 W"L 1864092, at *25 (U.S. 2005).
?Q Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, No. 04-1244, slip. op. (U.S. Feb. 28, 2006),
available a, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opiiiioiis/05pdf/04-1244.pdf
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as it was, the decision had largely symbolic meaning in closing out an
angry chapter of abortion jurisprudence. It was also another exhibi-
tion ofjudicial minimalisin.
Finally, in the abortion context, the Court put itself in position-
over the objection of the Bush Administration-to decide a major new
abortion controversy on narrow grounds, thus perhaps avoiding, at
least for some time, a reckoning with one of its more controversial
precedents. On April 21, 2006, the Court agreed to rule on the con-
stitutionality of the 2003 federal law'' banning nationwide the so-
called "partial-birth abortion" procedure 4  The law reflects Con-
gress's determination to override the Supreme Court's 2000 decision 3
striking down a Nebraska "partial-birth abortion" ban and finding that
such a ban must have a medical exception; Congress insisted in the
2003 law that there never is a medical necessity for the procedure it
banned.
The Administration had also filed a second appeal involving the
federal ban's validity,3b but it urged the Court simply to put that case
on hold, awaiting the outcome of the earlier appeal raising the same
constitutional issues. Opponents of the federal ban, however, coun-
tered that the Court should go ahead and grant review of the second
case, too, arguing that it presented an Ayotte-style remedy issue that
was not present in the other case. It is at least theoretically possible
that, if the Court were to resolve the cases based on the remedy ques-
tion, it would not have to resolve the underlying constitutional issue,
and the validity of the 2000 precedent-seemingly quite endangered
in the hands of the new Court-would not be addressed. The Court
granted the opponents' request onJune 19, 2006.
The stage is thus set for a second round of testing the Roberts
Court on abortion. No doubt, too much can be read into one part of
the Justices' caseload, just as too much emphasis has been placed
upon the abortion question in the W hite House selection and Senate
review of Supreme Court nominees. But there is no bellwether like
33 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 1, 117 Stat. 1201
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 1531).
M The case is Gonzales v. Carhad, docket 05-380, to be heard in the Court's next
term starting Oct. 2, 2006. The sole question presented can be found at
http://www.supiemecourtus.gov/qp/05-00380qp.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
3, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
?1 Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), ted. grrated, 126
S. Ct. 2901 (U.S. June 19, 2006) (No. 05-1382), available at http://
www'.supiemecourtus.gov/qp/05-01382qp.pdf (last visited July 25, 2006) (stating the
sole question presented in the Administration petition). This is the second of three
cases in which federal courts of appeals have struck down the federal ban.
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abortion, and conservative theorists keep looking for ways to push the
Court to reconsider that question.
Lawyers for conservative activists continue to fashion cases that
they hope can get the Court's attention, and provide a new look even
at Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton. 'M Indeed, with clients of
utmost symbolic celebrity in the abortion field-Norma McCorvey
('Jane Roe") and Sandra Cano ("Mary Doe")-a lawyer for the San
Antonio-based Justice Foundation has employed a Rule 60(b) motion
to attempt to reopen both Roe and Bolton. 9 The tactic (lid not work in
McCorvey" but the attorney, Allan E. Parker, Jr., undeterred, is trying
in Cano." It has been well over a year since McCorvey's appeal failed
in the Supreme Court, and there are now two new Justices on the
Court. By coincidence, the Eleventh Circuit ruled on Cano's case on
the very day that nominee Samuel Alito was being questioned by the
Senate Judiciary Committee on the future of the abortion precedents.
Said the Eleventh Circuit:
Even assuming all the proffered scientific or clinical evidence about the
effects of abortion submitted by Cano in support of her Rule 60(b) are
true, it does not change the fact that the district court did not have the
authority to reverse the Supreme Court's decisions in Doe oi Roe, noi do
42
we.
The Eleventh Circuit also quoted the Supreme Court's Agostini
decision:
Which left untouched the bedrock principle that "[i]f a precedent of
[the Supreme Court] has direct application in a case ... the Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the
Supreme Court] the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."...
37 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the (Cmstitution: Some Originalist
and Normative Arguments ftn (verruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311 (2005) (discussing reasons why the Court
should follow the text of the Constitution when it conflicts with precedent).
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
See aw Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (refitting the suggestion, likely in
some circles, that this is a fool's errand, since the Supreme Court permitted a Rule
60(b) challenge to a twelve-year-old precedent, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
and went on to overrule Aguilai, a major church-state precedent).
40 McCorxey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846 (5th Cir. 2004), celt. denied, 543 U.S. 1154 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 2005) (No. 05-1382).
41 Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2006), petition Joe cedi. filed, 75 U.S.L.W.
3065 (U.S. July 31, 2006) (No. 06-162).
42 Id. at 1342.
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The Supreme Court has never overruled Roe or Doe."
43, Id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)).
